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Abstract   
Based on a social constructivist framing, this article seeks to address the gap in the literature on the 
impact of Europeanisation on the national interest group political culture in general and in the post-
communist context in particular.  The impacts of Europeanisation on interest group domestic policy 
behaviour, in terms of national interest groups networking with their European counterparts, their 
contacts with EU-level decision-makers, and their access to EU funds, are tested based on the panel 
surveys which were conducted in 1996 and 2012 of the most influential interest groups in eleven 
policy fields in Slovenia.  Our key findings are that Europeanisation does support changes in the 
national interest group political culture in the direction of a more proactive approach in influencing 
national policy processes. However, Europeanisation explains only a small portion of the variability 
among the domestic policy behaviour of interest groups.     
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EUROPEANISATION AS A FACTOR OF NATIONAL INTEREST-GROUP  
POLITICAL-CULTURAL CHANGE: THE CASE OF INTEREST GROUPS IN  
SLOVENIA  
INTRODUCTION  
While the research into European integration literature, the interest in institutions, actors and 
policy processes have been dynamically developing, the analysis of cultural (ex)changes and the 
(re)creation of identities, common notions, norms and ‘ways of doing things’ have all been 
investigated to a much lesser degree. This is especially true of research into the extent and methods 
of incorporating the cultural elements of the political into the logic of domestic (national and sub-
national) discourse, identity and political behaviour. When it comes to taking the national 
contextualisation into account, particularly the idiosyncrasies of postcommunist systems, the lack of 
such research becomes even more critical.  
Indeed, research into the adaptations of institutions (the executive, the parliament, and the 
national systems for the coordination of EU matters) has been so rich as to incorporate not only case 
studies of old and new member states, but also comparative analyses and typologies. At the same 
time, research into interest representation has been more scattered and biased. So far, the literature 
on political parties1 has often applied theoretical-conceptual approaches that were previously 
developed within the framework of nation states and which predominantly focused on party 
phenomena in older EU member states and at the EU level. Similarly, interest group research within 
the context of European integration has been growing in various literature subfields, such as civil 
society, organised interests, social movements, the European public sphere and EU governance.2 
However, it has been considerably diverse and provides no conclusive findings.3 The two criticisms 




of various Europeanisation phenomena into the domestic realm) are particularly valid in the case of 
the research into interest groups in post-communist countries, which have been EU member states 
since 2004.   
On the one hand, the research into interest groups in the context of European integration has 
employed many theoretical/ conceptual frameworks in order to study the roles and impacts of interest 
groups within their national political systems.4 Even though empirical research into the European 
adaptation and activity of interest groups has proliferated, especially since the beginning of the 
1990s, a significant meta-analysis and general theory of interest intermediation at the European level 
still appears to be lacking.5  Likewise, the differences between the political cultures of the 
participating agents and the non-participating agents6 have remained underresearched.  On the other 
hand, however, the literature describing the changes in the political culture since the 1960s (primarily 
examining the advanced industrial societies) has focused on domestic social change and has tended 
to ignore the effects of globalisation (of which European integration is a part) on the political culture 
of national actors.7   
Taking into account the previous findings of the role played by the national context in the 
Europeanisation processes8, and in line with the expectation that EU membership would strengthen 
civil society in post-communist EU member states, we hypothesise that the Europeanisation of 
national interest groups tends to transform the political culture of interest groups in the direction of 
their playing a more pro-active role in national policymaking. More precisely, while using the 
working definition of ‘interest-group Europeanisation’ to mean national interest groups networking 
with their counterparts in the EU and with EU-level institutions – including the receipt of EU funding, 
we will test the differences between (1) the political and cultural characteristics of national interest 
groups involved in European networking and funding, and (2) the national interest groups not 




influences on civil society organisations in post-communist countries bring about a stronger and more 
pro-active civil society in these countries, we hypothesise that the Europeanisation of national 
interest groups (namely, when national interest groups network with their European counterparts, 
establish contacts with EUlevel decision-makers and receive resources from EU funds) actually 
makes a difference to the political culture of interest groups in the direction expected (for the purpose 
of this article, ‘political culture’ is defined in behavioural terms only).  
The case study of Slovenia is valuable because Slovenia has a rich interest-group tradition in 
terms of the number of organisational memberships per person as well as its (neo) corporatist 
arrangements compared to other post-communist EU member states.9 In addition, the available 
empirical data gathered from the same interest groups at two points in time (the 1996 project, L57832 
Policy Networks and Lobbying in Slovenia, and the 2012 project, N5-0014 INTEREURO - 
www.intereuro.eu; both funded by the Slovenian Research Agency) ‒ namely, eight years prior to 
Slovenia's joining the EU in 2004 and eight years after its accession, allows us to learn about both 
(1) the dynamics relating to the interest-group contextual path-dependence in the various stages of 
Slovenia’s joining the EU, and (2) the mechanism through which European integration processes 
have influenced national interest-group behaviour in a new post-communist EU member state.  With 
this dynamic insight, and the combination of long-term analysis with a comparison of different policy 
fields, this article attempts to address the methodological gap identified by Saurugger.10   
We begin by framing the primary research question with the constructivist theory of European 
integration processes, alongside which we will also give due consideration to the relevant aspects of 
the political cultural literature and the existing knowledge of the impact of European integration on 
the changing interest-group political culture. After presenting the empirical data analysis framework 





THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
  
Constructivist theoretisation of European integration processes   
  
Constructivism has developed into two main streams – social and theoretical 
constructivism.11 Social constructivism emerged from the segment of international relations (IR) 
which examines the character or quality of social reality in international relations whilst taking 
account of both the material and ideational aspects of that reality. The ideational includes both the 
individual and collective levels and is dynamic.12 Theoretical constructivism is more interested in 
the knowledge of reality. Here the knowledge is understood in a broad sense. IR social constructivism 
applied in the context of the EU would be typically interested in the social interaction of states (e.g. 
Alexander Wendt), the impact of national norms in the international realm (e.g. Peter Katzenstein), 
the impacts of images of international or supra-national (EU) governance on the political actors in 
Europe (e.g. Thomas Diez), and the impacts of European norms on domestic politics (e.g. Thomas 
Risse).13 The latter is particularly useful for our research since it goes beyond the state-centred IR 
notions. It takes into account cross-border interactions and organised interest-group activity, as well 
as the role of ideas, the impact of shared beliefs and the dominant discourses on (meso-level) policy 
processes.14 What makes it particularly relevant to our research is the rooting of constructivism in ‘a 
social ontology which insists that human agents do not exist independently from their social 
environment and their collectively shared systems of meanings ('culture' in a broad sense)’.15 
Furthermore, through daily practice, human agency not only creates and reproduces, but also changes 
culture.16  
Although socialisation through European contacts is important and can be studied in its own 
right17, in this article we will focus only on the linkage between the national interest-group 




EU and with EU-level institutions – including the receipt of EU funding) and its impact on the policy 
behaviour of these interest groups at the national level without looking ‘into the black box’ of 
socialisation processes.   
  
The concept of political culture and the research into interest groups   
  
Modern research into interest groups takes account of the fact that a comparative study of 
interest groups and the political processes can only be meaningful if interest-group systems are 
investigated in terms of both their culture and political structure.18 In line with the Westerncentric 
view, an early conceptualisation of the comparative study of interest groups distinguished variations 
among Western interest-group systems (as is the case with national political systems); however, it 
tended to relate to ‘other’ interest groups (political systems) simply as ‘nonWestern’.19 Nevertheless, 
the observation by Western authors that cultural changes may take place through networking20 
remains valuable.  So too do the distinctions between the ideological, the operational and the real 
political culture (based on evidence), together with the identification in the early 1980s of variations 
in the political cultures of communist countries.21  
 In this article we will build on the idea that political culture can be defined as ‘the set of 
attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which 
provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behaviour in the political system’.22 Since 
political culture covers political ideals as well as the operating norms of a polity, and is at the same 
time also a manifestation of the psychological and subjective dimensions of politics23, it in fact 
encompasses both norms and behaviour, the subjective and activist dimensions of politics.  Since 
political culture can be employed in studying meso-level politics, it may ‘travel’ among various 
systems, or it may exhibit variations within a particular political system over time.24 Nevertheless, 




unrealistic to expect any major change in interest-group culture in postcommunist new EU member 
states since 2004.  
  
Europeanisation and interest-group political culture change  
So far, research has revealed that since European Union integration, interest groups can no 
longer be active only at the national level. An increasing number of interest groups are entering the 
area of EU policymaking.26 In addition, European, national, and regional political processes are no 
longer distinctly separated.  In terms of the vertical dimension of the EU multilevel setting, interest 
groups also participate in EU policymaking and EU-implementation.27 Continued interaction among 
the EU-level and domestic-level interest groups has led to the development of a Europeanisation 
literature.28 The authors who refer to the Europeanisation of civil society29 reveal both the increased 
role of interest groups in governance at the EU level, the adoption of explicitly European rather than 
purely national dimension of civil society in the EU political system, as well as the weakness of the 
resource-poor NGO segment of the EU-level civil society.   
When looking at civil society in a post-communist context in the EU accession and EU 
member states in the post-1990s, both Europeanisation and democratisation processes matter. Not 
only this, civil society has also been considered to be a necessary pre-condition for democratisation 
of the (former) communist countries, and as such it has also been supported externally by Western 
countries and international organisations (including the European Community/European Union).  
Furthermore, there have been both high hopes as well as doubts that the Europeanisation of interest 
groups could serve as a democratising factor.30  However, just as Europeanisation was not ‘per se’ 
the primary goal of interest groups in older democracies, so too interest groups from post-communist 
EU accession states (and later EU member states) regard Europeanisation as an instrument for 
achieving their objectives rather than as a conscious end-goal31.  On one hand, it was already the case 




countries with Eurogroups depended on the willingness of Eurogroups to transfer some of their 
sectoral information, analysis and expert knowledge to the newcomers on subjects of EU policies, 
European institutions and legislative procedures within the EU.  On the other hand, national interest 
groups in the new member states instrumentalised such empowerment in their own domestic realm.32 
This insight seems to be largely the same as the research findings in old(er) EU member states, which 
have demonstrated that although EU policies have affected the political opportunity structures33 of 
interest groups, resources and domestic embeddedness34 can also influence the political behaviour of 
interest groups in the European Union.35 Additionally, the closer the relations with the national 
institutions the less European activities might be necessary for insider interest groups as they may 
also affect EU policymaking via national executives as members of the EU Council.36 In this article, 
we primarily relate to the national-level activity of interest groups under the influence of the domestic 
interest groups linked with the EU level.   
  
The (post)communist path-dependence  
Two main deficiencies can be observed in the predominantly Western literature37. Firstly, 
actors can be either civil or non-civil.38 Secondly, an established myth about the general weakness 
of civil society in post-communists countries has persisted. In parallel with this, some literature has 
emerged based on a greater awareness of the particularities of specific kinds of interest groups (e.g. 
trade unions, environmental, gender or regional interest groups) and their Europeanisation.39 
Furthermore, the study of interest groups in a post-communist context has increasingly recognised 
several dynamic aspects, namely:  the different communist legacies of various interest groups within 
the same country (e.g. an increase in the development of environmental organisations, a decline in 
trade unions)40; the important variations among the interest-group systems of post-communist 
countries41, including changes in the strength of civil society over time in various post-communist 




socialist interest-group systems in top-down and bottom-up terms.43 The legacy of the EU’s impact 
on civil society in the post-communist countries in the accession stage is believed to be ambivalent44, 
with findings indicating that various EU-level resources have empowered interest groups in Central 
Eastern Europe to act more efficiently at the domestic national and sub-national level45, as well as 
findings indicating that post-communist interest groups have had only a weak bottom-up impact on 
EU-level politics.46 In line with research into various older EU member states, which indicates the 
substantial impact of European integration on shaping the domestic systems of interest 
representation47 (including European organisational connectedness48), and in line with the fact that 
interest groups could make use of opportunities for multilevel venue shopping49, we would expect 
Europeanisation to exert a considerable influence on the behaviour of national interest groups in post-
communist EU member states.’  
  
THE THEORETICAL-ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ARTICLE  
  
While there are several key ‘umbrella’ research questions which have found a place in the 
research on interest-group politics within the framework of the European integration processes 
(Table 1), our investigation - broadly speaking - fits into the segment of research on the impact of 
interest-group resources and interest-group involvement in European integration on their role in 
domestic policymaking (marked in grey in Table 1).  
  
[Table 1 about here]   
  
For the purpose of our research, a social-constructivist approach is combined with the concept of 




framework of the multi-level political system of the EU, where interactions between levels are 
expected to make a difference at the particular level of the system – be it the sub-national, national 
or supranational. More precisely, our analysis focuses on the impact of the  
Europeanisation of national interest groups on their political culture. While political culture is a 
general phenomenon which can be approached from many different angles50, due to the limited 
availability of data, we will restrict our focus to the political behaviour/activity of interest groups.  
  
DATA, METHOD AND ANALYTICAL MODEL  
  
In order test our hypothesis that the Europeanisation of national interest groups transforms their 
political culture in the direction of playing a more pro-active role in national policymaking, we 
used data from two face-to-face surveys of representatives of seventy interest groups in the spring 
of 1996 and from ninety-seven interest groups between March and May 2012.  In both surveys, we 
used essentially the same measurement instrument, namely a survey questionnaire.  The 
population consisted of the most active interest groups from eleven policy fields: economic, social, 
housing and agricultural policy, policy towards the disabled, environmental protection, health, 
education, culture, sports policy and policy in the field of marketing/public relations.  We made 
our selection of interest groups according to those which had been identified as active by previous 
empirical research as well as by consulting scholars and experts in these particular policy sectors 
in Slovenia.  The questionnaire used for the 1996 survey was only adapted in 2012 to Slovenia’s 
full EU membership circumstances. To allow cross-time comparison, both data-sets from 1996 and 
2012 were merged into one data-set of a panel of the fifty interest groups, which participated in 
both time periods. To test the effect of Europeanisation, we conducted our analysis in two main 
steps. In the first step, within the panel of fifty interest groups, we observed changes from 1996 to 




step, we used a linear regression model to test the effect of Europeanisation on the differences 
between interest groups regarding their behaviour and activities in 2012 (the ninetyseven 
organisations surveyed in 2012 were included in the analysis).   
  
Two main variables were used in this study to test our hypothesis: independent variables on  
Europeanisation and dependent variables on interest-group activity in influencing policy process.  
Activities designed to influence policy processes (as a dependent variable or an outcome)  were 
measured by a composite index, which included five indicators of time spent for the following five 
particular activities: (a) organising concrete actions to solve broader social problems; (b) 
organising training for leadership or for members of an organisation/ group to lobby successfully; 
(c) drafting bills or amendments to bills in the procedure; (d) making contact with the persons who 
make decisions on the problem areas in which the organisation/group seeks a solution; (e)  
implementing or commissioning research about the social problems an organisation/ group is 
addressing. The time spent on each individual activity was measured on a five-point scale (1 – no 
time at all … 5 – a lot of time). A principal component analysis was performed beforehand for the 
population of interest groups in 2012 and the results supported our expectation that all five 
indicators measured the same variable51 - activities for influencing policy processes. Therefore, the 
index was prepared as an average value for all five indicators – again on the five-point scale52.   
  
Furthermore, we prepared our main explanatory (independent) variable, Europeanisation, as a 
composite index. Complete operationalisation of the concept of Europeanisation (interest groups 
networking with their European counterparts, national interest-group contacts with EU 
decisionmakers, and resources received from the EU) was possible only for the 2012 data53. 
Several questions from our 2012 interviews could be taken as an indicator of networking with 




Europeanisation, we conducted principal component analyses on variables that exclusively 
measure the connections and impacts of European organisations. The following variables were 
included in the analysis: (a) the interest group gains the majority of its support or assistance from 
interest organisations, from EU member states, or from EU-level interest groups (binary); (b) the 
EU structural funds are a key source of funding for the interest group (binary); (c) the interest 
group supports candidates at elections to the European Parliament (5-point scale); (d) the interest 
group has contacts with EU officials (5-point scale); and (e) the interest group has contacts with 
members of European parliament (5-point scale). The analysis confirmed our expectations: only 
one meaningful component (with an eigenvalue above 1) was extracted and loadings for all five 
indicators were high enough to include all of them in the composite index of Europeanisation.54   
  
THE LEVEL OF INTEREST-GROUP ACTIVITY  AIMED AT INFLUENCING POLICY  
PROCESSES – THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 1996 AND 2012  
  
The first survey of the interest groups in Slovenia took place in 1996, eight years prior to  
Slovenia’s full EU membership, whilst the second survey took place in 2012, eight years after 
Slovenia’s accession to full EU membership. The panel of fifty organisations participated in both 
surveys. Therefore, we have a quasi-experimental situation in which we can observe the level of 
interest-group activity in influencing the policy process both prior to and since Slovenia’s full EU 
membership. We assume that Slovenia’s EU accession could be an important fact in explaining the 
expected changes in interest-group activity. When comparing the values of the index for 
measuring activity influencing policy processes on the panel of fifty organisations in both time 
points, we can observe statistically significant differences: the level of activity is higher in 2012 
(with a value of 3.2 on the five-point scale) than in 1996 (with a value of 2.7) (see Table 2).     





When we examine the details and the entire sample set for both time points (the ninety-seven 
organisations in 2012, and the seventy organisations in 1996), we can see that the most active 
interest groups in both time points are not only active within their national borders.  By 2012, more 
than three quarters (76.3 percent) of the organisations surveyed are also members of international 
organisations.  The reason for this may be due to their search for support in attempting to influence 
policymaking or in seeking support in their main activity; we cannot be certain. This is higher than 
in 1996, when the proportion of organisations who were members of an international umbrella 
organisation reached two thirds (66.7 percent) of those organisations interviewed. Moreover, fifty-
one organisations (in 2012) devoted a lot of their time to networking with organisations from 
abroad.   
  
As discovered by previous research on interest groups55, interest groups do not decide to join EU 
associations based on any specific cost-benefit analysis, but rather due to more diffuse 
considerations. Since complete exit from EU policymaking may not be feasible, membership of 
EU umbrella organisations is worth paying for56. Indeed, many of the organisations interviewed, 
regardless of their membership of international organisations (including European organisations), 
turn to similar organisations abroad when attempting to influence policymaking at the national 
level in Slovenia.  Again, the share of the organisations interviewed which receive support from 
abroad is higher in 2012 (66 percent) than in 1996 (57.4 percent).  Support may not only be 
financial or material. In fact, only five organisations reported receiving material support. 
Knowhow and experience remains the most important form of support provided at both time 
points. In 2012, forty-eight organisations reported receiving support in the form of information and 
analysis, thirty-six in the form of expert help, and twenty-two organisations reported that they 




Slovenian decision-makers. Other forms of support include exchanges of experience, letters of 
support from interest groups in other European nations sent to Slovenian decisionmakers, as well 
as moral support or moral help.   
  
Despite the fact that organisations rarely receive financial support from international organisations, 
networking may help them to acquire funding from European structural funds.  In 2012, fifty-six 
organisations (out of the ninety-seven) are also funded through European programmes, whilst for 
twenty-two of the organisations European structural funds represent one of three key sources of 
funding. It is therefore not surprising that organisations from Slovenia for the most part turn to the 
EU for support. Twenty-four organisations receive most of their support from EU-level 
organisations while another twenty-four from organisations that come from other EU member 
states; only eleven organisations receive most of their support from (other) international 
organisation and two from national organisations that are not EU member states.  
  
Two questions still remain: Did Europeanisation substantially contribute to the changes in interest-
groups activity during the sixteen years between surveys?  And are there other more important 
(contextual) factors that affect the level of interest-groups activity? Simply comparing the data for 
both time points does not provide a satisfactory answer to these questions. Thus, we prepared a 
regression model of the 2012 data whereby we were able to compare the relative importance of 
Europeanisation to other possible factors influencing the activity of interest groups.   
  
EUROPEANISATION AS A FACTOR DETERMINING INTEREST-ORGANISATION  
ACTIVITY INFLUENCING POLICY PROCESSES IN 2012   
  
In general we assume that those interest organisations which are more Europeanised (namely those 




European interest organisations or from interest organisation from other European countries, etc.) 
are more active in influencing policy processes at the national level than those interest 
organisations which are less Europeanised.  We can support this thesis by observing the correlation 
at the level of the individual dimensions of Europeanisation and interest-groups activity 
(individual indicators included in the composite measurement of the Europeanisation of interest 
groups and interest-group activity). A bivariate analysis reveals that interest groups with access to 
EU structural funds as a source of financing more frequently organise training in lobbying 
techniques (30.4 percent) and more often draft or amend bills in procedure (57.1 percent)  than 
interest organisations without access to EU structural funds (12.2 percent, 41.5 percent) (see Table 
3).  The same pattern can be observed for the differences between interest groups in terms of their 
contacts with EU officials and the support they receive from interest groups in other European 
countries or from interest groups at the European level (see Table 3). In general, we can say that 
there is higher potential to influence policy processes among those organisations which are more 
internationally connected at the European level.      
  
  [Table 3 about here]  
  
Finally we tested the effect of Europeanisation on interest-group activity using the linear multiple 
regression model where the effect of Europeanisation was controlled for the following two 
variables (also possible factors of interest-group activity): 1) an interest group type (economic/ 
non-economic interest group)57; and 2) professionalisation (operationalised with the number of 
fulltime employed staff)58.  The extent of the Europeanisation of interest groups and their level of 
activity were measured with the composite measurement (indices) presented above. We prepared 
two regression models: 1) in the first model (Model 1), we observed only the effect of our primary 




variables) a further two factors (predictors) of interest-group activity, namely the type and level of 
professionalisation (FTE) (see Table 4).  Both models are statistically significant; however, at the 
same time, the predictive power of the independent variables included  
(R2) is rather low:  only 11.6 percent of the variability of interest-group activity is explained by 
Model 1 and still less than one fifth of the variability (18.2 percent) by Model 2 (Table 4). In 
general, these results confirm our hypothesis about the influence of Europeanisation: a higher 
degree of Europeanisation indicates a correspondingly higher level of interest-group activity – 
with an increase of the Europeanisation index by one unit value, the index measuring the activities 
for influencing policy processes increases by 0.233 of unit (Table 4 – Model 2).  
  
  [Table 4 about here]  
  
When two control (independent) variables are introduced to the model (Model 2), all three 
predictors are revealed to be statistically significant; however, the level of Europeanisation 
remains the most important (Beta = 0.319) while the type of organisation (non/economic) and the 
level of professionalisation are slightly less important and almost on the same level (0.215 and 
0.213) (Table 4).  Additionally, a comparison of Model 1 and Model 2 reveals that the predictive 
power of the model becomes stronger when the control variables are included: the amount of 
explained variance (R2) in the second model substantially increases compared to the first model 
(from 0.116 to 0.182). Thus we can say that not only does Europeanisation (the strongest effect 
within the model) have an impact on the activities of interest organisations, but also both control 
variables do too: a) a higher level of professionalisation brings a higher level of activity; and b) the 
fact that an organisation is an economic interest group contributes to the greater extent of activity 
of the organisation. The fact that a substantial amount of variance remains unexplained within the 




factors strongly contributing to the variability of interest-organisation activity in influencing policy 
processes.  Among them may be institutional factors (the political system opportunity structure 
including the neo-corporatist arrangements), the organisational characteristics of the interest 
group, and economic factors.  These organisational factors may also be alternative explanations for 
the more active role of interest groups in 2012 besides the Europeanisation process.  However, we 
ought to bear in mind that, although organisations from different policy fields are included in our 
analysis, they are in some aspects actually quite similar.  Most of the organisations have their 
headquarters in Ljubljana (the capital of Slovenia)59, which makes it easier for them to influence 
the (national) policy making process. It is also important to emphasise that the survey includes 
only those interest groups that were identified as active participants within the national policy 
making process (based on our information from previous empirical research as well as from our 
consulting scholars – experts in the particular policy sectors in Slovenia). Furthermore there are 
only minor differences in the level of education of the IG leadership (the survey respondents were 
mostly leaders of the interviewed organisations60) and their education is only rarely below college 
level61. Despite this fact, the interest groups surveyed differ regarding their level of activity in 
influencing the policy-making process.   
Furthermore, our analyses also show that the level of activity in 1996 (when controlled for the 
effect of Europeanisation) significantly determines the level of activity in 2012.62  Additional 
analyses also show the importance of various interest group resources: full-time employed, budget, 
the ownership of business premises, and connections with politics (e.g. the previous political 
functions of leading interest group members). But, even with these additional factors, the 
explanatory power of the regression model is not substantially improved; the highest level it riches 
is around 26 percent.  It is also important to stress that, along with the inclusion of these additional 




There is also one further consideration in our understanding of Europeanisation as the primary 
factor affecting the activity of interest organisations. Indeed, it is hard to draw a clear line between 
Europeanisation and the internationalisation of (Slovenian) interest groups. We can even argue that 
Europeanisation is just one aspect of internationalisation.  It is a fact that most of the organisations 
surveyed (in 2012) have connections to and receive support from their counterparts in Europe (at 
the national or supranational level). When we asked about the connections and support from 
similar organisations abroad, we found that 50 percent of organisations are primarily connected to 
and received support from similar organisations within the EU, whilst only 13.6 percent of 
organisations primarily gained support from organisations outside the EU, and approximately 36 
percent of organisations did not mention any connection with any organisation abroad.  To 
summarise, in the case of Slovenian interest organisations, we can say that ‘internationalisation’ 






Our analysis, based on the case study of Slovenia, has revealed that the interest group 
population as well as their characteristics have changed during the period from Slovenia’s 
preaccession stage to full EU membership.  Additionally, there are more interest groups active in 
Slovenia in the same policy fields in 2012 compared to 1996 - which could perhaps (also) be an 
indication of democratisation processes; in 2012 they are generally more internationally (in fact 
predominantly EU) connected, receive more support from abroad (effectively from the EU), and 
are also more active in national policy processes than in 1996.  Taking into account the literature 
on the political culture, it can be estimated that the interest groups investigated have experienced a 




But did Europeanisation in the last sixteen years (and especially after the 2004 
enlargement) substantially contribute to the changes in interest-group activity and are there other 
more important (contextual) factors that affect the level of interest-group activity? Our analysis 
shows that Europeanisation (in terms of the vertical interactions of interest groups) has in fact 
impacted to some degree on the political culture of national interest groups. It can be said that the 
activities for influencing policy processes at the national level increase with interest groups’ 
international linkages (these linkages being predominantly European). When controlling the effect 
of Europeanisation on interest-group activity for the impact of the two other possible factors of 
interest-group policy activities (economic/non-economic interest group type and interest group 
professionalisation in terms of the number of full-time employed staff), the hypothesis regarding 
the influence of Europeanisation has been confirmed.  A higher degree of Europeanisation in fact 
does also mean a higher level of interest-group national policy activity; however, when processing 
the data on the population of the most active interest groups in the eleven selected policy fields, it 
does not exert a great explanatory power. Even after including all the three variables in the model, 
only about twenty percent of the variability among interestorganisation activity in influencing 
national policy processes has been explained. This may still allow for the possibility that in the 
case that all the interest groups are included, regardless of the level of their policy activity, the 
explanatory power of Europeanisation in explaining the variations among interest groups may be 
greater. This may be the case even after testing the impact of various interest-group resources, such 
as full-time employment, budget, the ownership of business premises, connections with politics 
(the previous political functions of the interest group leadership).   
Through these lenses, Europeanised interest-group activity may be regarded as a bridge in 
the EU’s impacting on both particular policy activism and policy shaping in an EU member state 
(as previously also suggested by Hicks64). It may also be that the EU’s potential to intervene in the 
politics of new EU member states varies significantly across policy fields65; however, due to the 




It also remains to be fully investigated what the overall effect of the EU has been on the 
development of post-communist civil society (as well as the overall European civil society 
development), taking into account the EU’s selective impacts on particular segments of the 
national interest group universe only. Therefore, it is not only the national embeddedness of 
interest groups as a factor of Europeanisation that needs to be studied, but also the European 
embeddedness of Europeanised national interest groups through their European links (usually 
concentrated on a particular segment of the EU institutions and policy fields/issues) that seems to 
be important when investigating Europeanisation processes.    
Finally, even though our findings do support the thesis known in the social constructivist 
literature that Europeanisation makes a difference, the actual processes and the factors involved still 
need to be analysed. As it is not possible to identify any decisive impact that Europeanised national 
interest groups have on their political culture (in our research in fact national policy behaviour). 
Further research is also needed in order to explain fully the policy behaviour of interest groups in the 
national policy processes, taking into account more complex theoretical frameworks and also 
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Table 2: A comparison of activity spent influencing policy processes in 1996 and in 2012 (the 
mean values of the composite index and the result of the t-test)    
  
  N  Mean  
Std. deviation  
(SD)  
Std. error of mean   
(SEM)  
2012  50  3.216  0.79472  0.11239  
1996  50  2.732  0.63324  0.08955  



















Table 3: Activities for influencing policy processes and the Europeanisation of interest groups – 
bivariate analysis on 2012 data  
 
 A lot of time for     A lot of time for  
  
 training for lobbying  drafting bills  
Dimensions of Europeanisation:  
%  
χ2  
Cramer's V    %  
χ2 
Cramer's V  
Financing from EU structural funds               
 
 







57.1  2.328  
0.155  
     – no  12.2    41.5   
Support from interest organisations at EU  level 
or from other European countries           
     – yes  
33.3  
    
**6.149  
 0.252    60.4  
*3.726 
0.196  
  Activities of IG for influencing policy process:  
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     – no  12.2    40.8   
Contacts with EU officials                              
 
 
     – from time to time or regularly  
37.5  
    
**3.994  
  
0.203  66.7  
*3.328 
0.185  
     – rarely or never  17.8    45.2   










Table 4: Predictors of activity spent influencing policymaking – linear regression with regression 
coefficients (B) and standardised regression coefficients (Beta) (data from 2012)  
  
  









Model 2    
B  
Std.  
Error  Beta  
 (Constant)  3.241  0.070      2.934  .121    
Europeanisation index  0.259  0.071  **0.354    0.233  .069  **0.319  
(non) economic groups  -        0.319  .138  *0.215  
Professionalisation  -        0.106  .047  *0.213  
  
  Adjusted R2=0.116  
  F = 13.470**  
  N=96  
  
  Adjusted R2=0.182  
  F = 8.026**  
  N=96  
 
  ** p<0.01; *p<0.05  
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